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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are emerging as a critical source 
of liquidity in the global economy. As government surpluses grow, 
SWFs act as conduits by which these surpluses are invested abroad to 
create a significant return on investment for the sponsoring country. 
However, governments do not always welcome foreign investment 
within their country. In the United States, for example, increasing 
foreign investment from SWFs has rekindled a debate over the 
tradeoff between the positive economic benefits of capital inflows 
and the national security concerns that accompany such investments. 
This debate is fueled by the fact that many of the fastest growing 
SWFs are sponsored by governments that are politically at odds with 
the United States. In the past, this has led to protectionism, which 
tends to create political responses disproportionate to the actual risks 
posed by SWFs. However, state sponsored foreign investment does 
provide a method by which foreign governments can gain influence 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; J.D., 
University of Maryland School of Law, M.B.A., Robert H. Smith School of 
Business, May 2010. 
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over a domestic corporation and exert political pressure on the 
management, directors, and shareholders. This creates a valid 
national security concern that deserves a measured, rational response. 
In the United States, the Treasury Department tasked the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) with 
identifying and reviewing investments from overseas that trigger 
national security concerns based on the possibility that they are 
politically motivated.1 CFIUS recently released new regulations and 
guidelines meant to provide more certainty and clarity in its review 
process.2 To that end, CFIUS clarified an exception to its review 
process which carves out passive investments that constitute ten 
percent or less of a target company’s equity.3 More specifically, an 
equity stake equal to or less than the ten percent threshold with pro 
rata voting rights automatically falls under this exception to CFIUS 
review.4 However, shareholder activism is demonstrating that such a 
stake can create an excessive amount of influence and power while 
still falling short of the type of control that CFIUS is targeting. 
As SWFs increase their level of investment, shareholders of U.S. 
companies are using new methods to gain influence and control over 
corporate affairs. For instance, hedge funds are finding creative ways 
to influence board decisions by leveraging significant ownership 
interests in target companies. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has also introduced a number of proposed rules 
that seek to enhance shareholder democratization. Even shareholders 
have been effective in changing a number of corporate governance 
rules in their favor. Examined alongside CFIUS regulations, this 
movement towards increased shareholder rights and influence may 
exacerbate national security concerns in situations where SWFs have 
gained a significant equity stake in a corporation. 
Global economic organizations are addressing this issue through 
multilateral agreements rather than unilateral regulations like CFIUS. 
Many of the countries that sponsor the largest SWFs have joined the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) to 
 
1. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).  
2. See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by 
Foreign Persons, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008). 
3. Id. § 800.302(b). 
4. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign 
Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70702, at 70710 (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Merger 
Regulations]. 
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help publish accepted governance principles and best practices. For 
countries in which SWFs are actively investing (Recipient 
Countries), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has published investment policy guidelines as 
part of its Freedom of Investment initiative. On the other hand, 
neither of these groups has established an enforcement mechanism 
for their best practices or policy guidelines. 
Ultimately, national security concerns posed by politically 
motivated SWFs are being exacerbated by shareholder activism while 
simultaneously being offset by the activities of regulatory agencies 
like CFIUS and the development of international standards for 
governance and transparency within these state-owned funds. Many 
commentators believe that CFIUS has so far struck a proper balance 
between economic benefits and national security concerns.5 The issue 
is whether these developing movements will act as appropriate 
counterbalances, cancelling each other out and maintaining that 
proper equilibrium within the preexisting regulatory framework of 
Recipient Countries.  
II. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
SWFs “are special purpose investment funds or arrangements that 
are owned by the . . . government.”6 Due to the 2008 boom in 
commodity prices and an accumulation of foreign reserves,7 the 
holdings controlled by SWFs have grown to the point that the funds 
are now cornerstones of the global economy that facilitate the free 
flow of a significant amount of capital around the world.8 A recent 
study by Deutsche Bank found that the top ten SWFs control roughly 
three trillion USD, which amounts to eighty-five percent of total 
SWF assets worldwide.9 Furthermore, total assets under the control of 
 
5. See, e.g., George Stephanov Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory 
Framework: Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and 
National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2008). 
6. INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 3 
(2008) [hereinafter SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP], http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.  
7. Tom Lauricella & Anne Davis, Commodity Prices Surge as More Investors 
Seek Haven, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2008, at A1. 
8. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Their 
Investment Strategies and Performance 12 (Centre for Econ. Policy Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 6959, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308030.  
9. STEFFEN KERN, SWFS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES - AN UPDATE 5 
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SWFs are expected to grow to ten trillion USD by 2015.10 
The recent growth of SWFs reflects a redistribution of wealth in 
favor of emerging economies.11 Most of these funds are used by 
countries as a method to invest budget surpluses created through 
commodity exports, currency exchange activities, or other methods. 
Many state-sponsored funds throughout the world vary with respect 
to the size of assets under control, source of funding, degree of 
separation between the sponsoring government, transparency and 
disclosures, and asset allocation.12   
Historically, these funds have invested in riskless assets and debt 
instruments, such as U.S. Treasury Bonds and other low-yield bonds. 
However, many SWFs are now seeking higher rates of return by 
targeting riskier assets such as equity stakes in publicly traded 
companies, indirect holdings through hedge funds and other financial 
intermediaries, and private equity.13 While the financial crisis caused 
widespread losses among SWFs holding these riskier investments, 
the largest funds have already signaled they are ready to begin 
searching for new investments due to depressed asset prices.14 The 
power and influence associated with these types of investments have 
caught the attention of the governments of Recipient Countries. 
These governments are now closely examining the benefits and risks 
associated with foreign investment by SWFs in search of possible 
responses. 
Various economic benefits are associated with foreign equity 
investment. Most critically, SWFs allow governments with budget 
surpluses to boost the amount of capital available in global equity 
markets by diversifying billions of dollars across publicly traded 
 
(Deutsche Bank Research, Oct. 2008), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_ 
INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000232851.pdf. 
10. Id. at 6. 
11. Edwin M. Truman, Policy Brief: A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Best Practices 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. Policy Brief No. PB08-3, Apr. 
2008), http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf. 
12. Ronald Gilson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A 
Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1354–59 
(2008). 
13. Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. 
& BUS. REV. AM. 179, 179 (2007). 
14. Jason Dean & Lui Li, Feeling Flush, China’s CIC Opens Wallet, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 31, 2009, at C1.  
EVERLY MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:50 PM 
378 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:374 
companies.15 Given tightening credit markets, these macroeconomic 
implications provide a significant incentive for governments to 
embrace state-controlled foreign investment.16 SWFs may also invest 
directly in certain sectors where capital and liquidity may be needed. 
For example, equity investment by SWFs in the depressed U.S. 
financial sector, directed towards banks such as Citigroup and 
Morgan Stanley, boosted liquidity and abated short-term market 
volatility17 in the same way that the U.S. federal government bailout 
of the banking sector attempted to do.18 Governments that inhibit 
foreign investment risk damaging their economies and putting their 
countries at a competitive disadvantage compared to those 
governments that encourage the free flow of capital across national 
boundaries.  
On the other hand, links between a fund and the sponsoring state’s 
political establishment raise concerns that the motive to invest will be 
political rather than commercial. While each fund may maintain a 
different degree of independence from the sponsoring country’s 
government, SWFs are nevertheless ultimately funded by and under 
the direct control of a foreign state. China in particular has shown a 
proclivity for mixing politics and business, especially when a 
precious commodity is at stake. When a contractual dispute arose 
between the Chinese government and Rio Tinto, an Australian 
mining company, over benchmark iron ore prices, Chinese authorities 
arrested some of Rio’s employees in response.19 Shareholders of that 
company also turned down a takeover bid by Aluminum Corp. of 
China, a state-owned company, due to concerns that the Chinese 
government would use Rio to supply China with cheap iron ore.20 
Similarly, China used an investment in Fortesque, another Australian 
mining company, to secure a three percent discount on the 
benchmark price of imported iron ore.21 These examples show that 
 
15. Gilson, supra note 12, at 1360. 
16. Id. 
17. Fariborz Moshirian, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Sub-Prime Credit 
Problems 16, Table 3 (Sept. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275226. 
18. Deborah Solomon, U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 14, 2008, at A1. 
19. China and the Rio Tinto Detentions: The Steel Fist of Government, 
ECONOMIST, July 18, 2009, at 60. 
20. Shai Oster, China’s Iron-Ore Discount Hinges on Granting Loans, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at A10. 
21. Id.  
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China is willing to employ its growing financial resources and 
strategically invest in target companies to accomplish political 
goals.22 
This concern over political investment is compounded by a 
noticeable lack of transparency in key aspects of many funds’ 
management profiles. Many SWFs do not disclose their investment 
objectives, assets and holdings, governance structure, or 
performance.23 As a result, Recipient Countries are often left with 
very little knowledge or understanding of SWFs and their 
motivations.  
III. REGULATIONS AND AGREEMENTS AFFECTING SOVEREIGN 
WEALTH FUNDS 
A. Domestic Regulations Affecting SWFs 
The United States has put into place a patchwork of regulations 
that apply to some of the investments made by SWFs. These 
regulations govern securities generally, transactions in certain 
industries, and foreign investment specifically. 
1. General Securities Regulations 
Many of the regulations affecting U.S. securities generally are 
aimed at increasing disclosure and transparency rather than 
prohibiting control. For example, under the Williams Act, an investor 
or entity is required to disclose the number of shares beneficially 
owned, percent of share ownership, and voting power when it owns 
more than five percent of a registered class of shares.24 Further, if the 
intent of the purchase is to change or influence the control of the 
issuing company, then the acquiring entity must disclose the purpose 
of the acquisition, source of investment funds, number of shares it 
owns, voting power, and any material contracts or arrangements with 
respect to the securities.25 This greater disclosure is made to the SEC, 
 
22. The U.S. Government appears to have noticed this trend as well. A Chinese 
government-owned company recently decided to withdraw its bid for a Nevada 
gold mining company after CFIUS suggested it would intervene and block the 
transaction due to national security concerns. Eric Lipton, Chinese Withdraw Offer 
for Nevada Gold Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B3. 
23. Amy D. Keller, Sovereign Wealth Funds Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles 
of Strategic Ambition?, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 342 (2009). 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2002) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 
Exchange Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007). 
25. Exchange Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007). 
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the issuing company, and the exchange on which the securities are 
traded.26 In addition, Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 
requires a shareholder with a beneficial ownership of more than ten 
percent to disclose to the SEC the amount of its holding and to notify 
the SEC when there is a transaction that affects ownership of this 
share.27 
2. Transactions Affecting National Security 
In 1988, Congress passed the Exon-Florio Amendment,28 which 
amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 in response to the 
increasing number of acquisitions of U.S. assets by Japanese 
companies.29 Exon-Florio allows the President to block certain 
transactions to prevent foreign acquisition of U.S. companies in 
industries critical to national security.30 The clause granting this 
power uses broad language that allows the executive branch 
significant discretion when determining what transactions to 
investigate.31 With the Byrd Amendment of 1993,32 Congress 
specifically ordered the executive branch to review transactions 
involving a foreign government-controlled acquirer that affect the 
national security of the United States.33 Congress recently overhauled 
the Exon-Florio Amendment with the passage of the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).34 This Act 
sets out the most current framework by which foreign acquisitions 
and investments within the U.S. are reviewed, including equity 
investments by SWFs.  
The President’s powers under the Exon-Florio Amendments are 
delegated to CFIUS, an inter-agency body composed of the heads of 
various agencies.35 Currently, any CFIUS member may unilaterally 
 
26. Id. 
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), Pub. L. No. 291, § 1, 48 Stat. 881, 
896. 
28. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 721, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988). 
29. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 126–27 (2008). 
30. Jonathan C. Scagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much 
Congressional Involvement Is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 335 (2007). 
31. Id. at 338. 
32. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Byrd 
Amendment), Pub. L. No. 102–484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463, 2463–65 (1992). 
33. Id. § 837(a)(2). 
34. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 
121 Stat. 246 (2007). 
35. The twelve present members of CFIUS include: 
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trigger the review process upon suspicion that the transaction might 
affect national security.36 This rarely occurs though, as companies are 
encouraged to voluntarily provide notice of a pending transaction. If 
voluntary notice is given and no action is taken, CFIUS will not 
subsequently reverse this decision and review the transaction,37 
meaning that the regulations create a safe harbor that rewards foreign 
companies that voluntarily notify CFIUS of a proposed transaction. 
CFIUS has the authority to review only “covered transactions,” 
defined as any transaction “by or with a foreign person and [that] 
could result in control by a foreign person of a U.S. person or persons 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”38 The 
regulations further state that “[t]he term control means the power, 
direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, . . . to determine, direct, 
or decide important matters affecting an entity.”39 This broad 
definition of “control” allows CFIUS wide discretion in determining 
whether a transaction meets the required “covered transaction” 
threshold.  
However, to create certainty for foreign investors, the regulations 
provide that a transaction is not covered if it results in a foreign 
person holding ten percent or less of the outstanding voting interest in 
a U.S. business, but only if the transaction is solely for the purpose of 
passive investment.40 At first glance, “solely for the purpose of 
passive investment” seems to be a provision that allows CFIUS broad 
discretion to review any transaction it wishes. Indeed, the word 
“passive” was implemented in the most recent rule changes made by 
CFIUS in response to calls from Congress to address a perceived 
loophole.41 However, in its accompanying discussion, CFIUS states 
 
the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, and 
Commerce; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisers; the Attorney General; the Directors of the Office of 
Management and Budget and of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.   
Georgiev, supra note 5, at 127. For a more complete history of CFIUS, see Scagg, 
supra note 30. 
36. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 127. 
37. Id. 
38. 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a)(1) (2008).  
39. Id. § 800.204. 
40. Id. § 800.302(d)(1). 
41. See Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for National 
Security: Hearing Before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review 
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that a passive investment only includes an ownership stake less than 
ten percent with the ability to vote those shares pro rata.42 Thus, if an 
SWF acquires an equity stake with pro rata voting rights that 
comprises ten percent or less of ownership in a U.S. company, the 
transaction would not qualify as a “covered transaction” and 
therefore would fall outside of the purview of CFIUS. As later 
discussion shows, equity stakes of this nature may fall short of 
providing absolute control of a domestic entity to a foreign investor, 
but they do allow a significant amount of influence over target 
entities.43  
B. International Organizations Provide Voluntary Guidelines to 
Regulate SWFs 
Many industrialized countries have in place a review process 
similar to that of the U.S.44 However, many of these same countries 
are now encouraging a multilateral approach to the difficult questions 
posed by SWFs. Backed by the U.S., European Union, and others, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have set out to 
establish a best practices guide for both SWFs and countries 
receiving investment from SWFs. 
1. Best Practices for SWFs  
In response to the growing importance of SWFs, the IMF helped to 
establish the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (IWG).45 This group, consisting of twenty-six SWFs created by 
member countries of the IMF, sought to develop a list of voluntary 
best practices to be adopted by SWFs worldwide. The IWG produced 
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (GAPP),46 consisting of twenty-six principles based on 
a survey completed by its members.47 GAPP acts as “a framework of 
 
Commission, 110th Cong. Sess. 2 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb) [hereinafter 
Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement]. 
42. Merger Regulations, supra note 4, at 70710. 
43. See infra Part IV. 
44. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10 
COUNTRIES (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf. 
45. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 1.  
46. GAPP is also referred to as the Santiago Principles. 
47. CORNELIA HAMMER, PETER KUNZEL & IVA PETROVA, SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS: CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES (Sept. 2008), 
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generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect 
appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as 
the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound 
basis.”48 GAPP addresses three main underlying characteristics of 
SWFs: (1) legal framework, objectives, and coordination with 
macroeconomic policy, (2) institutional framework and governance 
structure, and (3) investment and risk management framework.49 
The first two characteristics focus on creating a governance 
structure that encourages the separation of political and commercial 
interests of a fund.50 Politically motivated investment is the crux of 
national security concerns under regimes such as CFIUS. Recipient 
Countries would rather see a mandated fund structure that requires 
commercial interests to take precedence over political interests. 
However, GAPP does not lay out a specific structure to be instituted 
by every SWF. Instead, the guidelines outline the broad goals that 
such a structure would seek to accomplish.51 The underlying rationale 
is that the structure needs to be adapted to the size, objectives, and 
roles of the SWF, as well as the regulatory regimes within which it is 
investing.52 The downside to this approach is that much of the 
discretion is left to the SWF, which may not be as interested in 
accomplishing the same goals as the Recipient Country. 
Furthermore, as stated above, compliance with GAPP is 
completely voluntary and the IWF does not plan to develop an 
enforcement mechanism.53 Instead, the IWG hopes to establish a 
standing group of SWFs, which will assist funds with the practical 
matters of implementing GAPP.54 The standing group will 
periodically review the principles so that they accurately reflect 
modern best practices. However, it remains to be seen how effective 
peer pressure within the international community will be in 
accomplishing widespread adherence to GAPP among countries 
 
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/swfsurvey.pdf.  
48. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 4.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 5. 
51. Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 138 (2008). 
52. Id. 
53. DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, MINDING THE GAPP: SOVEREIGN WEALTH, 
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 15 (2008) [hereinafter MINDING 
THE GAPP], https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/us_dtt_fs_mindtheGAPP_111108(1).pdf 
54. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 6.  
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hosting SWFs. 
While GAPP provides a signal of multilateral cooperation and 
support for unified action toward the emergence of SWFs, it also 
represents a negotiated compromise. The principles explicitly address 
concerns over politically motivated investments, but they are less 
ambitious concerning public disclosure and transparency.55 Some 
SWFs stand as examples of transparency and good governance,56 but 
others have objected to greater public disclosure for a variety of 
reasons, including privacy and competitive advantage.57 For example, 
the heads of both the China Investment Corporation and the Kuwait 
Investment Authority have publicly stated that increased transparency 
will compromise their first-mover advantage and inflate asset prices 
before they can establish their fund’s position.58 However, the 
regulatory systems of many western countries are built upon 
transparency and disclosure, and many governments have objected to 
the idea of inviting nontransparent investors to invest, at their 
discretion, large sums of money into the marketplace on the basis of 
market stability and investor protection.59 Still, the international 
community has tried to prevent these sorts of reactions by also 
developing a set of guidelines that countries should follow in 
response to receiving investments by SWFs. 
2. Principle Guidelines for Recipient Countries 
The OECD has released a best practices guide for Recipient 
Countries, which will supplement the work done by the IWG.60 There 
are four underlying philosophies that drive these guidelines in regard 
 
55. MINDING THE GAPP, supra note 53, at 14.   
56. CalPERS, in the U.S., and the Norwegian Oil Fund are generally held up as 
examples of SWFs that demonstrate these characteristics. See Delia Velculescu, 
Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way for Wealth Funds, IMF SURVEY MAGAZINE, 
July 9, 2008, at 110, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/20 
08/073108.pdf.  
57. See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Gao Xiqing, head of China’s new SWF, 
on 60 Minutes CBS television broadcast (Apr. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/04/60minutes/main3993933.shtml.  
58. Rose, supra note 51, at 141. 
59. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Gauer 
Distinguished Lecture in Law and Policy at the American Enterprise Institute Legal 
Center for the Public Interest: The Rise of Sovereign Business (Dec. 5, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch120507cc.htm). 
60. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY POLICIES 2 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter OECD SWF 
REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/9/40408735.pdf. 
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to national security.61 First, Recipient Countries should avoid 
discrimination by treating similarly situated investors in a consistent 
manner through generally applied principles.62 When general 
principles are not adequate to address national security concerns, the 
restrictive measures should be tailored to the specific investment 
causing concern and not to all investments from a particular 
country.63 Second, regulations that govern foreign investment should 
be made as transparent as required confidentiality will allow so that 
they create predictable outcomes and encourage investment.64 This 
includes publication and codification of applicable regulations, 
notification of changes in investment policy, procedural certainty and 
predictability, and disclosure of policy actions to reinforce 
government accountability.65 Third, the level of restrictions that 
regulations place on certain investments should be proportional to the 
national security risk posed by those investments.66 Finally, 
procedures for high-level government oversight should exist in order 
to create accountability in the implementing agency.67 This includes 
accountability to citizens of the country as well as to the international 
community. Accountability should also allow some sort of recourse 
through efficient administrative mechanisms when a Recipient 
Country takes action against a foreign SWF.68 
The principles promulgated by the IWG and the OECD are 
founded upon the solid ideals of free, fair, and transparent financial 
markets. For purposes of this discussion, the CFIUS review process 
satisfies most, if not all, of the OECD Recipient Country 
Guidelines.69 The greater concern is that the IWG guidelines for 
SWFs lack an enforcement mechanism needed to protect market 
participants lacking financial leverage or market information. Thus, 
these guidelines will most likely serve as a strong basis for future 
action in this area, but they do not ultimately protect Recipient 
Countries from politically motivated investments. This is especially 
noteworthy when viewed in conjunction with the increasing ability of 
 
61. Id. at 4. 
62. Id. at 5. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. 
65. OECD SWF REPORT, supra note 60, at 5. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Georgiev, supra note 5, at 134. 
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shareholders of U.S. companies to affect corporate affairs. 
IV. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Currently, shareholders in publicly traded U.S. companies are 
gaining more power and influence over the board of directors and 
thus, indirectly, over management.70 Many contend that this trend 
towards shareholder democratization will blur the separate, well-
established spheres of management and shareholder rights.71 
Historically, the rise of institutional investors, such as mutual funds 
and pension funds, was widely expected to have the same result but 
generally failed to live up to expectations.72 However, proposed 
regulations, changes in corporate governance aimed at increasing 
shareholder power within the corporation, and the success of 
aggressive hedge funds promise to push the trend towards corporate 
democratization to new levels.73 
A. Proposed Changes in Regulations 
The SEC recently reviewed new rules that would increase 
shareholders’ influence over management. For example, the often-
debated proxy access rule would allow shareholders to add their 
choices of candidates for the board of directors.74 Currently, a board 
has exclusive discretion in choosing candidates to fill board seats 
under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.75 
Commentators believe that changing this rule is critical to 
empowering shareholders.76 The SEC also considered rules that 
would effectively allow shareholders with a five percent stake in a 
 
70. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duty for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008). 
71. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing 
Field? (May 2008) (UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 08-12), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130969. 
72. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1278. 
73. Id. at 1307–08. 
74. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 72 (2008). 
75. Rule 14a–8(i)(8) allows a company to omit any shareholder proposal 
relating to the election or related procedure from the proxy materials. Press 
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Codify Longstanding Policy on 
Shareholder Proposals on Election Procedures (Nov. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-246.htm. 
76. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 
1259 (2009). 
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company to use corporate funds to pay for proxy contests.77 Access to 
corporate funds is one of the incumbent board’s most potent weapons 
against proxy fights, as it requires activists to spend significant 
personal resources. The SEC also reviewed rules that would eliminate 
“broker voting.”78 Current rules now allow brokers to vote their 
client’s shares on routine matters of the corporation, including 
director elections. Because brokers consistently vote with 
management, this provides a sizeable chunk of shares in the 
incumbent’s favor. If the proposal is successful in removing director 
elections from the definition of routine matters, incumbents would 
almost certainly face more pressure from challengers. 
While proposed rules favoring shareholder participation in 
corporate governance have suffered a number of set backs in the past, 
the financial crisis has made these changes much more politically 
attractive.79 For instance, Chairman Schapiro recently gave a speech 
strongly supporting the proposed changes.80 Congress also introduced 
a bill that would provide shareholders with a right to include their 
own director nominees in proxy statements.81 The intense debate 
taking place over corporate governance, within both the SEC and the 
corporate community, signals a broader movement towards 
challenging the status quo and increasing shareholder involvement in 
corporate affairs.  
B. Shareholder Influence over Corporate Governance Rules 
Shareholder activists have used their growing voice to champion 
changes to business practices and corporate by-laws. Shareholders of 
U.S. corporations have a fundamental right to vote on the election of 
directors and certain extraordinary transactions, such as mergers or 
 
77. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1282. 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Jeff Nash, Broker Vote Saps Shareholder Might, FINANCIAL 
WEEK, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20080428/REG/694771377. 
80. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the 
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue – 2009 Conference (Sept. 17, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch091709mls.htm). 
See also Karey Wutkowski, Lifting the Lid: SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy 
Access, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2008,  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1741224720080104. 
81. Phred Dvorak & Kara Scannell, Investors, Take Note: New Bill to Target 
Boards ‘Say on Pay’, WALL ST. J., April 25, 2009, at B2.  
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dissolutions.82 Out of practical concerns for efficiency, voting may be 
done by proxy. Under federal proxy rules, a proxy solicitation and 
statement containing a list of proposals is sent to each shareholder, 
who then casts a vote on each issue and returns the forms to the 
corporation.83 Shareholders have been using their right, under federal 
law,84 to add proposals to proxy statements to garner support from 
other shareholders. Increasingly, shareholders are using this process 
to introduce resolutions and proposals that are causing real changes to 
their corporation’s governance rules.85 
For instance shareholders in many corporations have proposed and 
achieved majority voting of directors.  Compared to plurality voting, 
which is the default rule in many jurisdictions including Delaware, 
majority voting increases the power of each shareholder vote86 by 
requiring a potential director to receive the majority of votes in order 
to be successfully nominated to the board.87 On the other hand, 
plurality voting rules only require a director to receive more votes 
than other candidates.88 Thus, unlike plurality voting, majority voting 
rules count withheld votes as “no votes” and make votes against a 
director meaningful.89 A study of various corporate boards 
demonstrates this trend, finding that sixty percent of respondents’ 
boards had adopted majority voting or will be considering the issue 
within a year.90  
Shareholders are also attacking the popular system of staggered 
terms for corporate board members. Under this system, only a certain 
number of board members are eligible for reelection each year. This 
prevents shareholders from replacing the board during proxy fights or 
 
82. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 59–60. 
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2008). 
84. Id. § 240.14a-8 (2008). 
85. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 68. But activist shareholders may also use their 
influence to pursue personal agendas. Paula Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing 
Social Change through Shareholder Proposals, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA 
ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2008). 
86. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR 
ELECTIONS (Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Feb. 2007), available at 
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majority_callen_020707.pdf.  
87. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 64. 
88. Id. at 63. 
89. Id. at 64. 
90. THE KORN/FERRY INSTITUTE, 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 
31 (2008), http://www.kornferry.com/Publication/9955.  
EVERLY MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2010  2:50 PM 
2010] A NEW VARIABLE IN THE CFIUS BALANCING ACT 389 
takeover battles.91 While proposals for majority voting rights receive 
much more attention, attacks on the staggered term system have also 
enjoyed widespread support among shareholders. As a result, some 
corporations recently abandoned staggered terms and others may 
follow.92   
Under each of these corporate governance changes, shareholders 
with pro rata voting rights are using their rights under federal proxy 
laws to add proposals to proxy statements and attempting to bring 
about changes in corporate governance. These changes are increasing 
the shareholders’ control over the corporation and blurring the 
previously well-defined line between shareholders and stakeholders. 
With the financial crisis pushing more shareholders to participate in 
shareholder meetings, activists should find it easier to win additional 
measures.93 This broad movement towards corporate democratization 
and increased shareholder rights is exemplified by the increasing 
number and size of aggressive, activist hedge funds. 
C. Hedge Funds Demonstrate New Methods of Influence 
Historically, individual and institutional investors’ attempts at 
activism were generally hindered by the need to diversify their 
assets.94 Investors’ relatively small stakes in publicly traded 
companies prevented them from seeking any real influence. Hedge 
funds, on the other hand, acquire large stakes in target companies for 
the purpose of becoming actively involved in their affairs.95 
Diversification poses less of a problem due to the fact that investors 
in hedge funds are usually wealthy and sophisticated and have 
already achieved broad diversification.96 
While a large stake in a target company does not provide a hedge 
fund with control over that company, it does provide the fund with a 
significant amount of influence. Hedge funds leverage this influence 
using different techniques, such as public pressure and the threat of 
proxy contests and litigation against management to change the 
 
91. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 70. 
92. Id. 
93. Mark Cobley & Elizabeth Pfeuti, Shareholders Increasingly Exercise Votes, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1252282132 
39489605.html.  
94. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1278. 
95. Id. at 1279. 
96. Id. 
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business’s strategy.97   
An institutional shareholder owning a large equity stake can put 
significant public pressure on a company’s management by 
signifying dissatisfaction with current management. Such 
dissatisfaction is usually followed by sale of the investor’s equity 
stake rather than proactive remedies.98 In order to align shareholder 
and management interests, the officers of a corporation are often paid 
with common equity, stock options, and bonuses triggered by stock 
performance.99 By depressing the price of the stock through the sale 
of a large equity stake, the institutional investor can both lower the 
market value of the company and significantly decrease the 
management’s compensation.100 A 2008 study supports this theory, 
finding that CEO turnover rates are higher and more new directors 
are appointed at companies with activist investors.101 Other 
shareholders may also be convinced to sell their stakes by the 
institutional investor’s actions, compounding the detrimental effect of 
the sale on the stock price. For these reasons, the directors and 
management of a company tend to heed statements made by 
institutional investors holding a large equity stake in their company, 
even if it represents less than ten percent ownership. 
For example, in 2005, a hedge fund named Third Point used public 
pressure to force the resignation of the CEO of Star Gas Partner LP.102 
Holding a six percent stake in the company, Third Point emphasized 
its position as the largest stakeholder in a press release that criticized 
a number of management blunders.103 CEO Irik Sevin stepped down 
from his position shortly thereafter.104 The hedge fund did not use any 
formal powers granted by corporate governance rules or rights 
pursuant to a preferred ownership interest. Instead, Third Point used 
 
97. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2007). 
98. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 462 (1991). 
99. Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1064 (2008). 
100. Id. at 1065. 
101. Alon Brav, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism 21 (ECGI Working Paper 
Series in Law No. 098.2008, Mar. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1111778. 
102. Third Point Demands That Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns 
Keys to Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, http://sev.prnewswire.com/ 
oil-energy/20050214/NYM31414022005-1.html.  
103. Kahan & Rock, supra note 97, at 1029. 
104. Id. at 1030. 
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the “soft power” associated with large equity stakes, which can carry 
great influence without any sort of formal legal right or power. 
The ouster of Citigroup CEO Charles Prince also demonstrated the 
sort of influence that an equity stake of a certain size can bestow 
upon a shareholder. In November 2007, Prince Walid Bin Talal, a 
wealthy Saudi investor with an investment portfolio that surpasses 
most hedge funds, recommended that the CEO of Citigroup be fired. 
Prince Bin Talal did not hold a seat on the board of directors, which 
would have provided him with this sort of authority. Rather, he 
controlled a 3.9% equity stake in the company.105 Nonetheless, 
Citigroup’s board decided to heed his advice based on the “soft 
power” created by the size of the Prince’s pro rata voting share.106 
These strategies can effect substantial change in a target company 
despite the fact that hedge funds almost never acquire a controlling 
equity stake.107 Instead, one study of activist hedge funds found that 
the “overwhelming majority” of funds took between a five and ten 
percent pro rata ownership share, with a median of six percent.108 In 
other words, hedge funds implement their activist strategies while 
holding positions that would qualify as mere influence, rather than 
control, under CFIUS regulations.109 
V. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM WILL INCREASE THE POTENTIAL 
INFLUENCE AND RISKS OF SWFS 
Due to the objectives given to CFIUS by Congress, as well as the 
need to encourage foreign investment within the U.S., current 
regulations offer few restrictions on SWFs that are sophisticated 
enough to structure their investment to avoid attention. While not an 
immediate concern, risks posed by excessive influence from foreign 
governments will be exacerbated by the movement towards greater 
shareholder rights and activism. However, CFIUS must avoid 
unilateral regulation that could cause extensive damage to the 
 
105. Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement, supra note 41, at 114. Prince Bin Talil 
has since increased his equity holdings of Citigroup to over 5 percent of the 
company. Madlen Read & Stephen Bernard, Citi Shares Sink Despite Saudi 
Prince’s Investment, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.realclearmar 
kets.com/news/ap/finance_business/2008/Nov/20/citi_shares_sink_despite_saudi_p
rince_s_investment.html.  
106. Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement, supra note 41, at 114. 
107. Brav, supra note 101, at 8. 
108. Id. 
109. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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economy and international standing of the U.S. in the midst of an 
existing economic crisis.  
A. Limitations on CFIUS Review 
As noted above, the newest regulations promulgated by CFIUS 
carve out an exception to the committee’s jurisdiction when an 
acquiring entity owns an equity stake of ten percent or less with pro 
rata voting rights.110 This exception represents the committee’s policy 
of concentrating on “control” rather than mere “influence.”  CFIUS 
makes clear that influence falling short of the definition of control 
does not fall within the purview of the regulations.111   
The ten percent exception is rare in the sense that the rest of the 
regulations generally eschew bright-line rules in favor of broad 
definitions that provide members of CFIUS with a good degree of 
discretion when determining which transactions to review.112 While 
CFIUS maintains that the newest promulgation of the rules blurs this 
bright line standard and expands the scope of its scrutiny by adding 
the term “passive” to describe exempted investments, the 
accompanying guidance reaffirms a carve out for certain 
investments.113 This half-measure could be a means to pacify calls 
from Congress and the public relating to legitimate national security 
concerns while recognizing that uncertainty in the regulatory process 
might discourage foreign investment at a time when liquidity is so 
badly needed.  
B. Hedge Funds as Predictors 
SWFs have an advantage similar to hedge funds. As stated above, 
hedge funds mitigate the problems of diversification through their 
sophisticated clients.114 While SWFs do seek to diversify their assets 
in most cases, the sheer size of the assets under their control allows 
SWFs to take significant equity stakes in even the largest publicly 
traded companies while still remaining relatively diversified.115 For 
example, some SWFs have invested billions of dollars into the risk-
laden equity of U.S. financials to take advantage of extremely 
 
110. See supra Part III.A.2. 
111. Merger Regulations, supra note 4, at 70704. 
112. See supra Part III.A.2. 
113. See supra Part III.A.2. 
114. See supra Part IV.C. 
115. Moshirian, supra note 17. 
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depressed prices.116 However, the percentage of the SWF’s overall 
assets that these investments represent is small enough that the equity 
stakes do not have a material impact on the fund’s risk profile. In 
other words, many of the investments made by hedge funds in target 
corporations, if governed by CFIUS regulations, would fall under the 
ten percent or less exception in the regulations. The size and type of 
investments taken by SWFs are often similar to the size and type of 
investment taken by hedge funds and institutional investors.117 Thus, 
activist hedge funds show that SWFs may leverage these investments 
to influence corporate affairs. As a result, foreign governments may 
use their influence to effect politically motivated changes in target 
corporations. 
C. The Balancing Act 
This risk is compounded by the fact that many of the tools that 
hedge funds, and thus SWFs, can use to gain influence over 
corporations are being bolstered by the general movement towards 
shareholder democratization. For instance, current trends toward 
proxy access and majority voting and away from staggered director 
elections will only make voting rights associated with equity stakes 
more influential.118 Instead of adjusting the regulations to account for 
the changing landscape, CFIUS chooses to keep in place an old 
framework, which was created before these significant changes in 
corporate governance occurred. 
As the democratization of corporate governance advances, the 
potential influence and power of SWFs that hold equity stakes will 
grow while, under the newest regulations, the ten percent exception 
prevents CFUIS from reviewing those investments. GAPP attempts 
to address the main concern of industrialized countries, namely 
politically, rather than commercially, motivated investments.119 In 
fact, the Treasury Department strongly supports GAPP to supplement 
the regulations designed by CFIUS.120 However, this international 
response, crafted by the very SWFs it seeks to govern, is careful to 
use softer, nonbinding language throughout. Further, it is unclear to 
 
116. See Liam Vaughan, SWF Investment in Financials at All Time High, 
FINANCIAL NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.efinancialnews.com/usedition/index/ 
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what extent GAPP will be implemented by most SWFs and there is 
no foreseeable enforcement mechanism.121 These facts suggest no 
change in one side of a previously balanced equation while, on the 
other side, shareholder activism is materially changing in favor of 
increased corporate democratization.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It appears the current U.S. policy towards foreign investment by 
SWFs is to wait and see whether multilateral agreements will be 
strong enough to prevent politically motivated investments. To be 
fair, it is unclear to what extent the IWG’s guidelines will be 
accepted and implemented by the international community of SWFs. 
However, this uncertainty speaks to the weakness of those 
agreements as an effective check against politically motivated foreign 
investment. 
On the other side of the equation, the evidence cited above 
provides little doubt that shareholders are seizing increasing power 
throughout the U.S. The opportunities to influence and control 
corporate affairs inherent in the positions taken by hedge funds can 
also be expected in the positions taken by many SWFs. As a result, 
CFIUS regulations leave open the possibility for foreign governments 
to gain more influence and control over American businesses through 
equity investment as shareholder democratization advances.  
 
 
121. MINDING THE GAPP, supra note 53, at 15.   
